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15 August 1951

STAFF CONFERENCE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Wednesday, 15 August 1951, at 1100 hours.

General Smith Presiding

Present

William H. Jackson, Deputy Director
Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director for Plans
Walter R. Wolf, Deputy Director for Administration
[redacted] Jr., Executive Assistant to the Director
[redacted] Assistant to the Director
Colonel Matthew Baird, Director of Training
[redacted] Advisor for Management
James H. Andrews, Assistant Dir. for Collection and Dissemination
George G. Carey, Assistant Director for Operations
H. Marshall Chadwell, Asst. Director for Scientific Intelligence
Kingman Douglass, Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
[redacted] D/Assistant Director for National Estimates
Max F. Millikan, Asst. Director for Research and Reports
James Q. Reber, Asst. Director for Intelligence Coordination
[redacted] Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Maj. Gen. Willard Wyman, Asst. Director for Special Operations
Perry Johnson, Acting Director for Communications

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1. The Director mentioned the case of one of our employees on the West coast who had recently gotten in trouble and had been asked to resign. In this regard, the Director feels that our personnel policy should be closely akin to that of the FBI. The private life of an employee is his own, but if he becomes embroiled in any situation that brings discredit on the Agency, he should be subject to dismissal.

Mr. Jackson stated that all cases of unpleasantness should immediately be brought to the attention of the Director's office. Moreover, the Director or the Deputy Director should receive notice of the possibility of unpleasant incidents taking place.

The Director again mentioned that personnel in CIA talk too freely about their duties. He asked the Assistant Directors to pay special attention to personnel security.

The Director stated that he will be in [redacted] on the 25th of September and will look at our [redacted] office. He suggested that General Wyman should make his trip abroad during September so that [redacted] could go in October. 25X1 25X1

2. Mr. Dulles, in reporting on his recent trip, said that he had visited too many places for too short a time. He had the feeling, however, that Europe appeared to be a very tired continent and was lacking in confidence. General Eisenhower had done a good deal to restore this confidence.

Mr. Dulles stated that there were many specific topics which he would discuss with individual Assistant Directors. In general, however, he mentioned three points:

a. To improve our coverage from Europe of Soviet intentions. He feels that perhaps the best opportunity for this is in the Eastern Zone of Germany. Our best source to date has been [redacted] working on our behalf. They have prepared and forwarded a report on what steps the USSR would have to take prior to an attack on Western Europe. 25X1

Mr. Dulles stated that there were [redacted] penetrations in the Eastern Zone which must be coordinated if we are to receive the maximum benefit and an early warning of any Soviet moves. 25X1

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Another means of covering Soviet intentions is through the Communist Parties in France and Italy. We are currently receiving lots of information from these Parties, possibly 50 per cent of which is fabricated. This effort must be intensified.

Mr. Dulles feels that we are trying to do too much overseas especially in Germany and that we are spread too thin. More concentration of effort will be necessary in the future.

b. Mr. Dulles mentioned the French and Italian elections and pointed out that although the Communists had lost seats they still controlled some 25 per cent of the popular vote. This is in spite of the work of ECA, CIA and other agencies. While in Paris and Rome, Mr. Dulles discussed with the American Ambassadors methods to be employed in combatting the Communist Parties in both countries. He feels that these parties have become the parties of protest and have acquired an aura of respectability. He believes that the French and Italian Government will have to take definite steps to remove certain privileges now accorded the Communist Parties.

One of the main strengths of these Communist Parties is their control of labor unions. In recent years, we have aided in setting up competitive unions but there is some question as to whether it might not have been preferable to maintain a strong minority in the already existing Communist unions.

Mr. Dulles feels strongly that our rear echelon is not secure so long as the Communist Parties in France and Italy control some 20 to 25 per cent of the vote.

c. Although a corollary of the above, Mr. Dulles mentioned as a separate item his many discussions with Labor leaders in France and Italy. He has great hopes of assistance from Labor

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Generally Mr. Dulles reported that our personnel abroad are doing a good job. He feels, however, that we should keep them better informed as to what is going on at Headquarters in Washington. The Director mentioned that he had already discussed the possibility of sending a monthly letter to the Senior CIA Representatives at the principal stations. The Director also mentioned the possibility of forwarding to other Senior Representatives the same type of intelligence now going to []

3. [] suggested that when Mr. Dulles prepares his memorandum on the Communist Parties of France and Italy, it should go to the NSC through the PSB.

[] stated that ONI was preparing to brief Admiral Fechtler and believes that we should also brief him on O/PC and O/SO operations. The Director suggested that he should come for lunch and then be given perhaps a two-hour briefing on CIA operations in general and O/PC and O/SO in particular. The Director will ask Admiral Johnson to arrange for this luncheon.

4. Mr. Reber mentioned the Interdepartmental Priorities Committee. The Director agreed that O/SO should chair the Committee and that Mr. Reber should generally represent CIA.

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